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ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY: 
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON COGNITIVE BIAS 
Martic G. I lasclton, Gregory A. Bryant, Andreas Wilke, David A. rrcderick, 
Andrew Galpenn, Willem E. Frankenhuis, and Tyler Moore 
University of California, Los Angeles 
A casual look at the literature in social cognition reveals a vast collection 
of biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize 
utility. One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the human mind is 
woeiully muddled. We present a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of 
evidence of biases: biases are (a) heuristics, (b) error management effects, 
or (cl experimental artifacts. We conclude that much of the research on 
cognitive biases can be profitably reframed and understood in evolutionary 
terms. An adaptationist perspective suggests that the mind is remarkably 
well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not 
fundamentally irrational. Our analysis is not an apologia intended to place 
the rational mind on a pedestal for admiration. Rather, it promises practical 
outcomes including a clearer view of the architecture of systems for judg-
ment and decision making, and exposure of clashes between adaptations 
designed for the ancestral past and the demands of the present. 
By casually browsing journals in the social sciences one can discover a collection 
of human biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize 
utility. Papers published in Social Cog11itio11 are illustr,1tive. In just 2007, the journal 
published a special issue dedicated to the hindsight bias, which is the tendency 
to belie\C that events that have occurred are more probable when assessing them 
after the fact than when estimating them prospectively (Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 
2007). Other examples include misapprehensions of probability like the hot hand 
fallacy that leads people to erroneously believe that basketball players who hm e 
shot several successful baskets are more likely to succeed on the next try (Gilovich, 
Vallone, & Tvcrsky, 1985). There are also many effects of emotion purported to 
cloud good judgment (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1996), overuses of stereotypes 
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991), misapprehensions of the motives of members of the op-
posite sex (Abbey, 1982), common violations of monetary utility in behavioral eco-
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nomic games (Camerer, 2003; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), and distortions 
of memory (Loftus, 2004). 
Consider the hindsight bias as an illustration. In studies demonstrating the 
hindsight bias, participants first estimate the likelihood that certain events will 
occur. A hindsight bias is found when individuals later report that their likelihood 
estimate was higher for events that did occur and lower for events that did not 
(Fischhoff, 2007). For example, if an initial skeptic recalled that her judgment of Ba-
rack Obama's likelihood of winning the 2008 presidential election was higher than 
her actual initial estimate, she would have committed the hindsight bias. There are 
several possible explanations for such an effect: the bias could be (1) a byproduct 
of an otherwise useful wa} of thinking, (2) an artifact of research designs that pro-
duce apparent flaws in thinking that arc actually unlikely to happen in the natural 
world, or (3) a genuine error or fla\o\ in the mind (Haselton & Funder, 2006). 
The general tendency in psychology is to interpret the supposedly incorrect 
iudgment or reasoning in terms of the last of these categories-as a genuine er-
ror or flaw in the mind, perhaps resulting from some sort of cognitive limitation 
(Lopes, 1991; also see Krueger & Funder, 2004, for a recent review). From an evo-
lutionary perspective, however, it would be surprising if the mind were really so 
woefully muddled. The mind is an intricate, evolved machine that has allo\o\ ed 
humans to inhabit and exploit an incredible range of em ironments. Humans ef-
fectively solve a variety of social-ecological problems including large-scale coop-
eration, social exchange, habitat formation, agriculture, and cumulative culture. 
We are a remarkably intelligent species, capable of surviving and reproducing in a 
complicated and ever-changing world. Could it really be that the human mind is 
as deeply flawed as the literature suggests? 
Knowledge of biases and illusions is of course valuable. For example, demon-
strating that a bias may occur in some situations but not others (context effects), 
or with certain classes of information and not others (content effects), can reveal 
structural features of the mind. Addit1onally, knowledge of biases and illusions 
may have important practical utility by preventing undesirable outcomes. For ex-
ample, a pilot approaching a runway under conditions of reduced visibility might 
be subject to fatal visual illusions (Waldock, 1993). Nonetheless, we believe that 
the pendulum has swung too far away from documenting good judgment and de-
cisions (also sec Funder, 1987; Haselton & Funder, 2006; Krueger & Funder, 2004). 
In this paper we outline an evolutionary perspective that reexamines biases and 
may cause the pendulum to swing back toward the center, shifting the focus away 
from flaws and toward an understanding of how natural selection-the process 
that generates functional design in nature-has shaped the human mind. This per-
spective leads to serious questions about whether evidence of bias and error re-
veals irrationality, and can teach surprising lessons about adaptive ways humans 
have evolved to think. We first consider what we should expect the mind to do 
well and then introduce a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of bias effects. 
Biases might be l1e11ri!>tics, error management lffects, or experimental artifacts. We con-
clude with a discussion of the benefits of reconsidering evidence of irrationality in 
an evolutionary light. 
ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY 
WHAT SHOULD HUMANS DO WELL? 
SOCIALITY, ECOLOGY, AND THE ADAPTIVE 
PROBLEMS OF OUR ANCESTORS 
735 
It is useful to begin by considering reasonable hypotheses about what the mind 
has evolved to do well. Humans are an intensely social species, and thus should 
possess cognitive machinery designed to handle the computational problems as-
sociated with social life. For example, because people engage in reciprocal social 
interactions with nonrelatives, we should expect a suite of cognitive adaptations 
designed to reason effectively about social exchanges (e.g., cheater detection; for a 
comprehensive review, see Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). ln a ll domains of social rea-
soning we should see a variety of adaptive designs including evaluating commit-
ment and sexual interest in prospective mates, diagnosing personality, navigating 
social hierarchies, learning from knowledgeable conspecifics, and so on (Haselton 
& Funder, 2006). 
We should also expect the human mind to reason most effectively when pre-
sented with ecologically valid problems of the sort our human ancestors would 
have been likely to encounter (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). These include problems in 
particular content domains, such as those listed above, and in the informational 
formats present over human evolutionary history. For example, asking research 
participants to perform logical operations over abstract inputs (e.g., probabilities) 
or in artificial settings should be particularly likely to reveal apparent lapses in 
rational thinking (Gigerenzer, 1998). Concrete, naturalistic problems in domains 
such as parenting, mate choice, social exchange, social learning, and the like are 
the places where we should focus for evidence of adaptive specialization. 
Lastly, an evolutionary perspective raises questions about the assumptions many 
psychologists hold about what counts as rational. Our human ancestors needed to 
find mates and reproduce, avoid getting killed, protect their families, avoid diseas-
es, and obtain resources. Psychological mechanisms that have evolved to achieve 
these ends might not perform well against modem standards of monetary maxi-
mization and subjective well being, such as finding happiness, being "logical," or 
even representing the truth. 
DOES ADAPTIVE= TRUTHFUL? 
Traditionally, it was thought that humans differed from animals in that they were 
gifted with a propensity to uncover and strive for truth, or some version of it, 
such as correct judgment and logical inference. In fact, many theorists today still 
think along these lines, often implicitly, but in some cases explicitly. Fodor (2000), 
for example, recently declared, "there is nothing in the 'evolutionary,' or the 'bio-
logical,' or the 'scientific' worldview that shows, or even suggests, that the proper 
function of cognition is other than the fixation of true beliefs" (p. 68). In a recent 
exchange with Fodor, Pinker (2005a; also see Fodor, 2005; Pinker, 2005b) pointed 
out that the process of natural selection is not concerned with truth per se, and in 
some instances even disfavors a truth-seeking mind. For example, there are many 
adaptive problems in which the best solution sacrifices costly truth-seeking in fa-
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vor of fast approximations. Moreover, beliefs play an important role in our social 
life, so pure inference is not the only function they serve. As Pinker (200Sa) noted, 
"People are embraced or condemned according to their beliefs, so one function of 
the mind may be to hold beliefs that bring the belief-holder the greatest number of 
allies, protectors, or disciples, rather than beliefs that are most likely to be true" (p. 
18). The conviction that one's own social group is somehow special, or even better 
than other comparable groups (e.g., Chow, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008), or the belief 
that one's current partner is the most amazing and irreplaceable person in the 
world (e.g., Murray, Holmes, Dolderman, & Griffin, 2000) could lead the believer 
to behave m ways that might contribute to his or her social success (e.g., conferring 
privileges to in-group members could lead to repeated exchange interactions ben-
efiting all parties, or investing in a romantic partner might result in the production 
of viable offspring, etc.). 
In order to generate adaptive beha,•ior, the brain will sometimes use heuristic 
reasoning procedures, make fallible assumptions about the world, and hold false 
beliefs. As philosopher Patricia Churchland (1987) remarked, "The principal func-
tion of nervous systems is ... to get the body parts where they should be in order 
that the organism may survi\·e .... Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hind-
most" (pp. 5-18-5-19). The idea that the primary function of the brain is to generate 
true beliefs and valid inferences is, of course, not entire!}' wrong. An organism that 
always made im·alid judgmenb nnd fabe inferences could not be very successful. 
But this is quite different from claiming that the brain essentially strives for truth, 
as if it were ernlutionarily optimized for arriving at truthful judgments and logi-
cal inference. From an evolutionary perspective, truth should matter only to the 
degree that it contributes to survival and reproductive success. 
AN EVOLUTIONARY TAXONOMY OF COGNITIVE BIASES 
Earlier we outlined three explanations of apparent cognitive biases: (1) byproducts 
of an otherwise useful way of thinking, (2) artifacts of research designs that pro-
duce apparent flaws in thinking that are actually unlikely to happen in the natural 
world, or (3) genuine errors or flaws in the mind. From an evolutionary perspec-
h\ e, effects in the third category can occur in individuals as a result of novel mu-
tations or developmental defects. They can also arise as human universals due to 
suboptimal "kluge" solutions produced by a selection process that must innovate 
on the basis of random mutations and build upon existing structure (see Marcus, 
2008). One well-known universal suboptimal design is in the visual system the 
retina is installed batkwards, producing a blind spot in each eye (Marcus, 2008; 
Williams, 1992). l lowever, clear examples of such kluges arc relatively rare in com-
parison to the many systems that appear exceptionally well-designed; and, while 
suboptimal, kluge solutions like the retina perform surprisingly well. In sum, we 
acknowledge the existence of genuine flav.::s in the design of the mind, but we 
contend that these flaws will be relatively rare or comparatively minor aspects of 
systems that are otherwise well adapted. 
Leaving aside the notion that the mind is riddled with major flaws, we are left 
with the idea that apparent biases either reflect the operation of generally use-
ful systems or arc artifacts of research designs. The evolutionary taxonomy we 
present subdivides the former group into two categories. The first, heurist1cs, are 
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generally effective, often simple rules of thumb whose operations entail some 
limitations. This is the explanation of biases favored b) most researchers in social 
cognition, including those who tend to vie\-\ the mind as flawed. We\-\. ill argue, 
however, that only a limited number of biases are likely to fit into this category and 
that many heuristics are amazing!} more effecti,·e than complex decision-making 
strategics. The second, effects of error-111a11age111c11t, are cases in which errors that 
were less costly over evolutionary history are favored over more expensive ones, 
producing biases in the direction of the less costly error (Haselton & Buss, 2000). A 
large number of new phenomena have been documented as a result of theorizing 
about error management, demonstrating the utility of this way of reconceptual-
izing the judgment strategies we should expect to find in the mind (Haselton & 
Nettle, 2006). The remaining category, artifacts, are biases or errors that result from 
research strategies in which people are given problems in unnatural formats or are 
evaluated on the basis of questionable normative standards. Surprisingly, many 
of the most famous biases might fall into this category. Table 1 summarizes the 
taxonomy (,1lso see Haselton & Funder, 2006; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005). 
These taxonomic designations are not intended to organize bias phenomena into 
mutually cxclusi\ e categories. For example, as we discuss below, some heuristics 
may contain an error management component. Rather, we present the taxonomy 
as a way of organizing e' idence of bias and error in order to evaluate the extent to 
which it indicates irrationality. 
We ultimately rnnclude that the mind is best described as adaptively rational. 
By adaptt,cly rational we mean that the mind shows evidence of psychological 
design for coping with recurrent adaptive problems our ancestors encountered 
over evolutionary history-the mind is equipped with mechanisms that are con-
strained and sometimes imprecise, but nevertheless clear products of natural se-
lection sho\\ ing e\ 1dence of good design. This definition runs in contrast to the 
often implicit definitions of rationality used by many social science researchers, 
including that the mind should maximize "accuracy," happiness, well-being, fi-
nancial return, or adherence to abstract rules of logic. We do not deny that it is 
useful to compare human performance to these standards, as they may be those 
we wish to maximize in the modem \.VOrld. Instead, we challenge the idea that de-
viations of performance from the standards means that the human mind is deeply 
flawed or poorly designed. 
It is also important here to clarify the difference between proximal and distal 
causation. In social cognition, researchers often refer to "motivated reasoning" 
that benefits the self (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988) or is good for relationships (e.g., 
Murray ct al., 2000). Although much of this evidence is well accepted, it also can 
be viewed as contradicting some definitions of rationality- particularly those es-
pousing maximal accuracy. A reasonable question is the extent to which these more 
standard social cognitive explanations for biases arc altern"1tives to evolutionary 
explanations for biases. We view them as complementary and typically operating 
at different le,·els of causation. Whereas many of the evolutionary explanations we 
offer in this paper make reference to causation in deep time that has shaped the 
mechanisms of the mmd, social-cognitive explanations usually refer to causation 
occurring in "near-time" involving contemporaneous motives and goals. 
For example, people ""ill often differentially recall enmts from their past that 
confirm a posith e opinion they have about themselves, such as remembering more 
academic successes than failures, which confirms one's status as a good student 
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TABLE 1. Evolutionary Taxonomy of Evidence of Bias and Error 
Cause of Apparent Bias Examples 
---------~-
1/ t • LJ fl< t 1 c · Heuristics are ett1dent solutions to • One-rc•ason decision strategies, such as the 
probll'n1' of Judgment and choice when time, rt'Cognition heuristic tGigerenzer & Goldstein, 
knowledge, and intormatron processing capaci- 19%) 
tics .ire c:onstra1nl'd (e.g .. Gigerenzer, Todd, & • Hindsight bias as memory updating (Hoffrage 
tht• ABC Rewar<.h Group, 1999). Heuristics et al., 2000) 
wor~ well in most circumstances but can (,iii in 
systt>m,itic w.iys. Apparently poor periormante • Default assumption of nonindependence (an 
results when heuristics are studied in ,1bsence ad,1pt.11ion to dumped resources, Wilke & Bar-
of environmental context. rcll, 2009) 
lrmr 1\1.in.1genwnt; Sele<.tion favors bias toward 
the IPss rnstly error (I iaselton & Buss, 2000). 
hror m.111,1gement causes overall rates ol error 
to increase, though net costs are minimized. 
Artifact: App.1rpnt biases and errors are artilacts of 
research strategies. Biases result from the appl 
cation ot inappropriate norms {e.g., Cosm1de< 
& Tcx>h\, 19961 or the placement of humans in 
unn,itur.il <cttmgs. 
• Auditor> looming (e.g .. Neuhoff, 1998) 
• Defense overrespon<1veness (e.g., Nesse, 2001) 
• S(·xual overperception by men (Haselton & 
Buss, 2000) 
• Some instances of b.ise-rate neglect (Hertwig & 
Gigcrenzer, 1 <J99J 
• Some instance~ of confirmation bias tCosmides, 
1989) 
(e.g., Kunda, 1987). Re-;carchers have attributed this to motivated reasoning-that 
is, a tendency to evaluate evidence in a manner that leads to a desirable assess-
ment. Proximately, people might indeed be motivated in such a way, but this docs 
not fully explain the phenomenon. Evolutionary-based ultimate explanations of-
ten incorporate proxunate motivations as means to adaptive ends. In this example, 
the moti\ation to maintain a positive self-assessment via a biased recall process 
might contribute to better performance, across a variety of domains, than either a 
negative assessment, or an unbiased one (Nettle, 2004; also see Taylor & Brown, 
1988). Enhanced performance, in tum, can lead to a variety of fitness benefits, in-
cluding attracting mates or social allies and gaining access to resources. It's not 
that people just "want" to believe it-believing it actually helps them. 
HEURISTICS 
FROM HEURISTICS-AND-BIASES TO A 
STUDY OF MINDS-IN-ENVIRONMENTS 
Most researchers in social cognition favor the view that heuristics are simple, effi-
cient shortcuts applied in judgment and decision-making when people face overly 
complex tasks, have limited time or cognitive ab iii ty, or deal with incomplete infor-
mation in the world. ln this light, heuristics work well in many instances, but are 
prone to break down in systematic ways-and whenever they do, more "evidence" 
has been found that the mind is flawed in its reasoning abilities. The traditional 
treatment of heuristics has been largely dominated by researchers working within 
the heuristics and biases program (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974), who have argued that human judgment often substantially 
de\ 1ates from optimality predictions or normative standards of logic. Classic ex-
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amples in this school of thought demonstrate the poor performance of research 
participants judging sequences of coin flips or making probability estimates about 
the likelihood of situations described in word vignettes. This program, however, 
generated much controversy when researchers questioned \'\ hether the proposed 
heuristics were sufficiently precise to be useful model.., of psychological function-
ing and whether the tools used to assess the functioning of the mind were ecologi-
cally valid and therefore capable of yielding irn>ights into the adequacy of every-
day decision-making (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). 
A fundamental criticism of the heuristics and biases program is that research-
ers might be neglecting the structure of the world in which the decision-making 
takes place. Ecologically-minded scientists have argued that in order to under-
stand the mind's true cognitive abilities one needs to consider the environment in 
which it operates-or was designed to operate by natural selection. For example, 
Egon Brunswik (1955) emphasized that psychologists should study how the mind 
makes inferences based on the informational cues present in the natural environ-
ment, and Roger Shepard (2001) saw the mind as a mirror reflecting regularities 
of the physical world (see Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Consequently, what we call 
a good or a bnd decision (or rnt1onnl or 1rrntionnl behavior) has to be judged with re-
gard to specific decision environments rather than in a vacuum (Gigerenzer, Todd, 
& the ABC Research Group, 1999). 
A related criticism addresses how much information is usually available in 
these decision environments and if the clear standard for comparing decision 
outcomes-the supposedly optimal way of thinking-should necessarily be in-
formed by abstract standards of probability, logic, and mathematical optimization. 
Many traditional models of rational choice assume that humans (and animals) 
make inferences about the world virtually as if they were supernatural beings that 
have unlimited reasoning power, boundless knowledge, and unlimited time to 
make their decisions. However, real-world decision environments, both current 
and past, do not look like this and it is unrealistic to compare the human capacity 
for judgment and choice against such optimality predictions and assumptions (see 
Gigerenzer ct al., 1999). For example, humans almost never have access to all of the 
pertinent information needed for making a decision about which mate to choose, 
what foods are best to eat, or which house to buy. Rather than following models 
of unbounded rationality, researchers pointed out that many decisions are made 
in a boundedly rational way (i.e., under conditions of limited time, information, 
and cognitive processing) and that heuristics are psychologically plausible solu-
tions in situations where the one best solution does not exist or cannot be reached 
anyhow. 
COGN ITIV[ LIMITATIONS CAN BE BENEFICIAL 
Researchers have produced many new empirical findings by examining reasoning 
in concrete environments and incorporating the realistic everyday constraints de-
cision-makers face in a world that favors bounded rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer, & 
the ABC Research Group, in press). Numerous experiments and a range of formal 
simulations have shown that a whole famil) of simple decision-making rules that 
use only one or a few pieces of information can work as well or better than more 
complex decision algorithms that use all of the available information (e.g., Brigh-
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ton, 2006; Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999). The recognition heuristic, 
for instance, allows for making judgments about which of two alternatives will 
be higher on some criterion value by picking the alternative that is more familiar 
(e.g., which stock will be more successful or which city is larger; see Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). Consider the following example. When asked which of two cities 
has a larger population, San Diego or San Antonio, most German students tend 
to guess right: San Diego, the city with which they are more familiar. American 
students who are asked to make the same choice, howe,·er, are more likely to an-
swer incorrectly. This finding is an example of the less-is-more-effect: Only German 
students can use the recognition heuristic because American students are equally 
familiar with both cities and hence rely on cues other than familiarity, which are 
often less valid as predictors of size. 
The less-is-more example illustrates that cognitive limitations, such as limited 
knowledge or limited processing capacity, can actually be beneficial. In some in-
stances, they can even enable important cognitive functions. The rather small nat-
ural limit in our working memory capacity, for instance, facilitates the detection of 
correlation coefficients in small samples as the working memory imposes valuable 
constraints on the size of the information sample we take into account (Hertwig 
& Todd, 2003; Kareev 2000). Another example is provided by the earlier noted 
hindsight bias, which can be understood as a byproduct of an adaptive memory 
process and learning after feedback (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Once 
an additional event occurs, our knowledge is updated to reflect this new informa-
tion and our knowledge after feedback becomes systematically shifted towards 
the new, updated reality. Thus, when the decision maker has to recall an earlier 
judgment in the future, the recalled judgment will be closer to the outcome of the 
new event than to the original judgment. 
PRESENT AND PAST ENVIRO!\IMENTS 
The concept of ecological rationality describes the match between structure and 
representation of information in the environment on one side, and the simple de-
cision-making algorithms such as heuristics on the other. Whenever this match 
exists, heuristics can perform well (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Examples of ecolog-
ically-rational heuristics can be found m \ anous problem domains such as parent-
ing {Hertwig, Dads, & Sulloway, 2002), mating (Miller & Todd, 1998; Todd, Billari, 
& Simao, 2005) and food choice (Scheibehenne, Miesler, & Todd, 2007). Sometimes, 
however, it is important to consider the match between mind and the past environ-
ments in which the mind evolved. It is this latter focus that can provide insight 
into adaptive rationality, insight that is necessary when current and past environ-
ments differ. 
As an example, consider the work of Wilke (2006) on human foraging behavior 
in patchy environmenb, which illustrates that an awareness of ancestral condi-
tions can be the key to understanding human decision-making strategies. When 
resources are distributed in patches (i.e., areas with a high density of the resource 
surrounded by areas with low density), animals are required not only to make 
decisions on where to forage, but also on how long they should forage in a particu-
lar patch as resources diminish (Charnov, 1976). Behavioral ecologists have stud-
ied simple decision mechanisms that solve this problem of patch time allocation 
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(Bell, 1991) and identified resource environments \'\'here these mechanisms work 
well (Iwasa, Higashi, & Yamamura, 1981). Different patch-lca\ing strategies are 
necessary because resource environments differ in how resources are distributed 
across patches. The number of resource items within a patch can either be simi-
lar (e\'enly dispersed distributions), completely random (Poisson distribution), or 
some patches may only contain a few items while others will be very resource 
n(h (aggregated distributions). Wilke and colleagues tested how well humans can 
adapt their patch-leaving behavior when faced with such resource distributions 
in a computerized foraging game (Hutchinson, Wilke, & Todd, 2008; Wilke, 2006; 
Wilke, Hutchinson, & Todd, 2004). The results showed that participants applied 
patch-leaving rules that were particularly appropriate for aggregated environ-
ments also in other types of environments (e.g., those with evenly dispersed and 
Poisson distnbutions). Why was this the case? Were research participants ecologi-
cally irratio1111/? 
This finding is less puzzling once one considers that aggregation in space and 
time, rather than dispersion, is likely to have been the norm for most of the natu-
ral resources humans encountered over evolutionary time. Species of plants and 
animals rarely, if c\'er, distribute themselves in a purely random manner in their 
natural environment, because individual organisms are not independent of one 
another: Whereas mutual attraction leads to aggregation for some species, mutual 
repulsion leads to regularity (dispersed environments) in others (Taylor, Woiwod, 
& Perry, 1978). Most often, these deviations from randomness are in the direction 
of aggregation, because aggregation offers considerable benefits such as a com-
mon habitat, mating and parenting, or the benefits of group foraging (Krause & 
Ruxton, 2002). Since humans have been hunters and gatherers for about 99% of 
their lustory (Tooby & De Vore, 1987), it could well be that our evolved psychology 
ts adapted to assume such aggregated resource distributions as the default. Thus, 
partidpants in the foraging experiment might not have behaved ecologically ra-
tionally, but rather l'7.10/11tio11arily rationally- in the sense that they are behaving in 
wa) s th<1t are rational gi\ en the structure of the human evolutionary environment 
(c.f. Wilke, Hutchinson, Todd, & Czienskowski, 2009). As \\e discuss later in the 
arttfacb section, the idea that humans expect aggregation in space and time also 
helps to explain why apparent misconceptions of probability, such as the hot-hand 
fallacy (Gilovich et al., 1985), may not reflect fundamental shortcomings of the 
human mind. 
HEURISTICS: SUMMARY 
The examples in this section illustrate that in an uncertain world, good decisions 
might often require ignoring part of the available information (Gigerenzer, 2000). 
Compared to more complex algorithms, heuristics are fast (because the underly-
ing algorithm is simple) and frugal (because they utilize only little information) in 
their decbion-making process. In contrast to the classic heuristics and biases view-
point, these decision strategies can be seen as exquisitely adapted to problems 
present and past because simple decision strategies are often truly effective and by 
no means weal.. compromises that reveal limitations of the human mind. When 
human cognition is studied with respect to real environments, past and present, 
heuristics display their full potential by exploiting the structure of information in 
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the real world. Ecological and e\olutionary rationality specify the environments in 
which heuristics perform well, and adaptive rationality includes both of these. 
ERROR MANAGEMENT 
Laboratory research on "error" ... attracts a great deal of attention because of what 
many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reason-
ing. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same 
thing as a "mistake."-Funder (1987, p. 75). 
Using heuristics, people can make rapid adaptive decisions using simple and reli-
able cues, but they are still at risk of making errors. Eliminating errors altogether 
is rarely, 1f ever possible, but it is possible to systematically commit one type of 
error over another. imagine the problem of reliably identifying a recurrent danger 
in the cm ironment such as venomous snakes. For any given relevant percept (e.g., 
a long sine·wy object on the ground), one must make a decision: snake present or 
no snake present. Because of the dire consequences of being bitten by a poisonous 
snake, it is better to have a low evidentiary threshold for inferring that Jong slen-
der objects are snakes, and to identify every snake you encounter, than to require 
too much evidence and occasionally get a costly surprise. Put in more technical 
terms, because both types of error cannot be minimized at the same time, asym-
metries in the costs of two types of error (false positives and false negatives, also 
often labeled false alarms and misses) should lend systems to be biased in the 
direction of the least costly error. This is the underlying logic of a recent approach 
to signal detection called error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000; also 
sec Nessc, 2001, on the smoke detector principle, and Wiley, 1994, for a treatment 
in animnl behavior). 
Error management theory applies evolutionary logic to signal detection theo-
ry-an approach to psychophysics derived from statistical decision theory over 
50 years ago (Tanner & Swets, 195-l). In signal detection theory, performance in 
sensory tasks is understood as a hvo-stage process of discrimination and decision. 
People must determine whether some target object (i.e., the signal) is present in 
a stimulus, but in addition to the signal, there is not only irrelevant information 
in the environment (external noise) but also variability in the organism perceiv-
ing it (internal noise). Traditional signal detection analysis explains how decision 
criteria will be affected by the differentinl costs of false positives and false nega-
tives. Decision makers must decide whether to adopt a liberal criterion (more false 
alarms, fewer misses) or a conservative criterion (fewer false alarms, more misses). 
This approach to sensory processes has proved quite fruitful in understanding a 
variety of phenomena such as detecting tumors in mammograms and cracks in 
airplane wings (see Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2002; Swets, 1998). 
Until recently, a consideration of the historical fitness costs of errors was not in-
cluded in the analysis of biases by signal detection theory. Error management the-
ory added this crucial element to an existing powerful tool (also see Wiley, 199-l). 
One critical component in the determination of where people will set decision cri-
teria across many domains is the fitness cost associated with different errors. Error 
management theory proposes that a cognitive system will be biased in a particular 
direction depending on the recurrent cost asymmetry associated with inferences 
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in that problem domain. Although error management biases often increase overall 
error rates and thus appear irrational, they minimize o\·erall fitness costs. In the 
remainder of this section we will describe how error management theory has been 
applied to understand perceptual biases, biases invoh ed in dealing with threats 
from pathogens and out-group members, and mating decisions. We then describe 
potential applications of error management theory in other cognitive domains, 
such as language use. Table 2 summarizes the mam studies that have applied error 
management theory in these domains. 
PERCEPTUAL BIASES 
Perception researchers have recently begun to appreciate the important relation-
ship between historical asymmetries in error costs and the design of information 
processing systems. For example, Neuhoff (1998) found that listeners perceive 
tones with rising intensity to be changing faster than equi\alent tones falling in 
intensity. Auditory looming, as the effect has been named, is well explained in an 
error management theory framework. The enhanced saliency of rising intensities 
associated with approaching objects causes Listeners to reliably underestimate ob-
ject arrival time. The bias occurs with tones but not broadband noise (Ghazanfar, 
Neuhoff, & Logothetis, 2002; Neuhoff, 1998) showing design for sound that not 
only provides reliable single-source information, but sound made almost exclu-
sively by biological organisms. Any time a bias affects perception of the actual 
physical environment, there are risks of misapplying it to irrelevant objects that 
could lead to any variety of costly errors. The degree to which this is trne will 
largely determine how advantageous the bias will be, and thus its impact over 
evolutionary time. In the case of auditory looming, the costs of false alarms (e.g., 
wasting time by being ready too early) are relatively low compared to the costs of 
misses (i.e., not being prepared for an approaching object). The difference in these 
costs allows for the selection of a bias that causes people to systematically overes-
timate a reliable auditory cue of movement towards a listener. 
Other researchers have found various perceptual biase<:> that error management 
theory explains well. People tend to differentially judge the steepness and distance 
of hills relative to flat ground as a function of the perce1\ed difficulty of traversing 
them, a potentially adaptive bias tuned to costs of navigat10n effort (see Proffitt, 
2006). Viewers also judge heights as greater when looking at a vertical surface 
from the top rather than the bottom, reflecting a predicted evolved bias to reduce 
costs associated with falling Oackson & Cormack, 2007). These examples illustrate 
the powerful role evolution plays in shaping perceptual systems in response to 
adaptive problems. What appear objectively to be errors in judgment might actu-
ally be beneficial biases that help organisms make decisions that minimize fitness 
costs. 
REPONSES TO DISEASE AND OUTGROUP THREAT 
Protrctizie Biases in Disease Defense. The threat of contaminants and disease is also 
likely to have shaped error management biases. Nesse (2001) argued that bodily 
systems including allergies and coughing are adapti\ ely over-responsive. These 
TABLE 2. Key Applications of Error Management Theory Supported in the Research literature " ~ ~ 
Domain Bias False Positive False Negative Cost of False Positive Cost of False Negative Type 
Pcrtcption Auditory looming: Tones arc Rising intcn,ities per· Rising intensities per· Lo" Approaching High. Approaching objects arnvc Paranoid 
pcr<eiwd to change fas1cr when ccivcd to rise faster ce1vcd to rise more objects arrive later eJrlier than e~pectcd (e.g., a 
they are ri,ing r.ither th.in falling slowly than expected (e.g., a falling rock I; failure to avoid 
e.g., Ghazanlar et al., 2002; f.tlling rock) object 
Neuhoff, 1998 
Perception Overestimate stecpnC<>' of hills Perceive hills as stcq>er Perceive hills a> gentler, Low: Miss out on High: Expend considerable Paranoid 
(e.g., Proffitt. 20061 and farther away than rolling. and clO<>Cr rl'SOurccs in difficult energy traversing very difficult 
they .idually .ire than they actually are terrain terrain 
Perception Owrestunate heights when look· OvcrL"timate height Underestimate height Low: More cautious High: l e<>s cautious around dan· P.sranoid 
ing at vertical surface from when looking down when loo~ing down .1round dangerous gerou~ heights 
top compared to bottom le.g., from top from top heights 
lackson & Connack, 20071 
Disease Rejecting food that is actually Avoiding a food that ts Eating food th.it is Low: Mi" out on poten- High: Sickness or death as a result Paranoid 
edible (e.g .. Garcia, Hankins, ,'l, usually harrnle,;s harmful lial food source of eating dangerous food 
Rusiniak, 1976: Rozin & Kalal, 
1971 
Disease Avoid individuals with nonconta- Avoid a pcrwn who is Commune with a person Variable, potentially low: High: Become infected. gct sick, Paranoid 
giou; phy,ical afflictions (e.g., not 1nfectiou' who is infectious miso;ccl wcial partner and potentially die 
Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Park el 
al., 2001) 
Disease Physical overrespon-.e to disease Unnecessarily strong So reaction or weak Variable, potentially High: Be.:ome infected. get sick, Paranoid 
threats re.g., Nesse, 2001) reaction to disc.isc or reaction to disease low: Waste energy and potenttally die 
nondiseao;e agent agent by mounting ph)sical 
response 
Conflict&. Individuals are prO'>OClal even rn Infer that one's selfish· Infer that one's selfish- Variable, potentially low: Vari.iblc>, potentially high: Earn Paranoid 
Cooperation ~ituations \'there they don't n<.'Cd ness might be clctccled ncss might not be Lc,,;c romc rewuRes negative reputation .ind risk 
to he \Y,1magishi et .ii., 2003. by others even when detecu>d by othe~ unnecessarily '>Ol:ial ostraci<m 
2007) it's not e•cn though ii is ::t > 
Conflict & Fear harmll'Ss outgroup mcmhcrs Assume outgroup mcm· Assume outgroup mem· Variabil', potentially Very high: Unprepared for Jtta<:k Paranoid VI rn 
Coop<·ration (e.g., Maner et al., 2005; ber' .ire ha<;tile \'then bcrs are friendly when low: Mis> potential or c•ploilalion by oulgroup !:; 
Schaller et al.. 2003) they are not they are hostile cooperation partner m£'mllt'rs 0 
z 
rn 
-4 
> 
r 
Conflict& Be overconfident of one's abilities Assume strength relative Assume weakne5s Highly Vilriable: Engag· Highly Vilriable, potentially Optimistic 
Cooperation in wars and competitions (e.g., to opponent when one relative to opponent ing in conflict with very high: failure to exploit 
John..on, 2004; Johnson et al., ls actually not stronger when one is actually stronger force opponent for re.ourccs; lowc.r 
2006) stronger l'E"Olve again't enemy; preemp-
tive surrender 
Inferring intL>rC$1 when Often low: wasted court· Mating Men's ovcrperccption of women's Inferring no intcrc-;t High: missed reproductive op- Optimistic 
sexual intert!'t (e.g .• Haselton, there is none when there is interest ship effort portunity 
2003; Maner et al., 2005) 
Mating Women's undcrpeKeption of Inferring commitment Inferring lack of com- High: Desertion Low· Dcla>·ed start to reproduction Paranoid 
men's commitment intent intent when then• is miiment intent when 
(Haselton & Buss, 2000) none there is commitment 
intent 
Mating Women's overperception of men's Assuming sexual coer· Failing to detect o;cxual Low: Mis"><.-<l opportunity Very high: Un"anted pregnancy; Parannid 
<.exual coerciveness at high civcncss when tht>re coerciveness for '><Xial interaction 1>liminat1on of iemal1> choice 
fertility (e.g., Garver-Apgar et is none partner 
al., 2007) 
Mating Underperception of romantic Assuming partner has Assuming partner has Potentially high; Partner's Low: Extra time and energy spent Paranoid 
partner's forgivene!>s after a fully forgiven when s/ not fully forgiven resentment might trying to appease partner 
transgr5sion ie.g., Frie.en et he hJs not when <Jhe has diminish rdalionship 
al., 2005! stability 
Mating ,\1en's overestimation of likelihood Assuming partner Failure to detect partner Variable, potentially Very high: Lost reproductive PJranoid 
that current partner has been unfaithfulness when infidelity high: loss of trust in opportunity; Investment of 
sexually unfaithful (Andrews ct partner was faithful partner; possible alien- resources in offspring not one's 
al., in press) ation of partner O\vn; loss oi partner 
:-.:ote. The table presents -;elected examples of findings that can be Interpreted in the Error Management fral'TK'WOrk. The biases arc categorized as paranoid (assuming that the state of the world is 
less desirable than it is in reality) or optimistic (assuming that the state of the world is more desirable than ii i• In reality). Adapted from Ha,elton and ,..,.ettle {2006" 
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systems are triggered in the absence of a real threat, and dampening their respons-
es with drugs or by other means typically results in few negative outcomes. This 
is so, he argued, because the costs of being over-responsive arc small compared to 
the cost of being under-responsive to the pathogenic threats these defenses help 
to combat. 
The same logic applies to food aversions, particularly in environments in which 
food is abundant. Aversions to specific foods are reliably acquired in human and 
nonhuman animals following just a single incidence of sickness after eating a spe-
cific food (Garcia, Ilankins, & Rusiniak, 1976; Rozin & Kalat, 1971). Even if these 
sicknesses were caused by something other than the food, systematically erring 
on the side of caution and avoiding food associated with sickness would often 
enhance survival in food-abundant em ironments more than erring on the side of 
excessive permissiveness in food choices. 
If other people posed reliable threats of disease throughout e\olutionary history 
(see Schaller & Duncan, 2007), humans could also possess adaptive biases that lead 
them to feel disgusted by and selectively avoid certain classes of others. One cue of 
disease that may precipitate such avoidance is the presence of physical abnormali-
ties, including lesions, discoloration, impaired motor function, and atypical ap-
pearance of body parts. These cues might also indicate a history of accidents (e.g., 
falling) or bodily harm inflicted by others, each of which is not a communicable 
threat. The multiple factors that can cause physical disfigurement produce a signal 
detection problem with a serious consequence: because it is difficult to know with 
certainty the source of a physical anomaly, error management logic predicts that 
humans will err on the side of avoidance and treat phenotypicaJJy atypical others 
as if they are vectors of disease even when they are not. Kurzban and Leary (2001) 
proposed precisely this logic as an explanation for the pervasiveness of stigma as-
sociated with physical disabilities. 
Recent research has directly tested this error management hypothesis about 
disease and disability. The \\.Ork c;howed that people who perceive that they are 
vulnerable to disease are less likely to have disabled friends (Park, Faulkner, & 
Schaller, 2003). In addition, in reaction time studies, participants exposed to a dis-
ease prime unwittingly associated diseac;e with well-known noncontagious indi-
\ iduals with disabilities, more so than with nondisabled individuals (Park et al., 
2003). These results support the view that rather than being irrational, stigma sur-
rounding disabled individuals is part of an evolved disease avoidance system that 
errs on the side of caution. 
Protecth1c Biases i11 Response to 011tgro11p Threat. Similar error management logic 
applies to outgroup threat. For ancestral humans, the cost of falsely assuming that 
outgroups were peaceful, and consequently being unprepared for an aggressive 
assault, would often have outweighed the comparatively lower cost of maintain-
ing increased wariness toward friendly outgroup members. This reasoning is con-
sistent with research showing that members of competing coalitions or out-groups 
are believed to be less bene\·olent (Brewer, 1979) and more hostile (Quillian & Pag-
er, 2001) than are members of their own group. These biases can be strengthened 
by ecologically-\·alid contextual cues. For example, when there is ambient dark-
ness rather than ambient light, individuals face greater risks of being attacked. In 
laboratory research manipulating light levels, participants tested in dark condi-
tions had greater beliefs that out-group males are violent than those tested in the 
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light (Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). Similarly, 
when induced to feel fear, participants saw more anger in the neutral faces of out-
group males as compared to those induced to feel romantic arousal or in a neutral 
emotion condition (Maner et al., 2005). In sum, a variety of findings reveal a bias 
toward assuming that outgroup members arc dangerous, especially when under 
conditions of increased threat. 
Beyond these examples, error management logic applies in a wide array of do-
mains relating to conflict and cooperation with others, including social exchange 
(Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma, & Kanazawa, 2003; Yamagishi, Terai, 
Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007), overconfidence in war and competitions 
Gohnson, 2004; Johnson et al., 2006), and beliefs about the intentions of others (Bar-
rett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). With respect to the latter, for example, Barrett 
et al. (2005) showed adults animations of a variety of social interactions involv-
ing only naturalistic motion cues (modeled after Heider & Simmel, 194-1). In the 
study, both German adults and Shuar hunter-horticulturalisb from Ecuador were 
accurate m 1udging a variety of intention patterns, including chasing, following, 
courting, and so forth. The viewers in each group also had a systematic false alarm 
bias such that they inferred chasing when chasing was not present more so than 
the same false alarm for other intention categories. The authors of the study specu-
lated that this pattern could reflect a universal error management bias designed to 
avoid the high costs of missing malevolent intentions in others. 
BIASES IN MATING AND ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
The previous sections show that many biases have probably evolved to cope with 
physical threats posed by the environment or other organisms. Error management 
theory has also been useful for identifying and classifying biases in the domain 
of mnting. Jn this section, we describe a number of biases that people show when 
assessing the intentions of potential or current mates. We begin by reviewing the 
evidence pertaining to the most well-known error management hypothesis-the 
male sexual overperception hypothesis. 
Sexual Ot1erpercept1011 by Men. In the ancestral past, men more so than women 
gained fitness advantages by engaging in opportunistic sexual encounters "'ith 
multiple partners (Trivers, 1972). The logic behind this proposal is that the sex 
with fewer obligatory investments in offspring (pregnancy, lactation) and higher 
reproductive potential (i.e., number of offspring which possibly could be pro-
duced), most often the male, substantially increased offspring number by mating 
more often. In contrast, for females, the costs of such a quantity-oriented strategy 
often outweighed the benefits. Women, for example, incurred tremendous costs as 
a result of having sex, including a minimum of nine months of pregnancy and a 
substantial lactation period. Only when the benefits of reproduction with a partic-
ular mate outweighed these costs did women benefit from having sex. As a result, 
men are generally more sexually eager than women and thus often more will-
ing to engage in short-term uncommitted sexual relationships (Clark & Hatfield, 
1989; Li & Kenrick, 2006) and with more partners (Schmitt et al., 2003; Simpson & 
Gangestad, 1991). Relative to men, women are more selective in their choice of sex 
partners and often require indications that partners will invest time and resources 
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before sex, during pregnancy, and throughout child rearing (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; 
Pillsworth & l laselton, 2006b ). 
Because men benefited more than women from short-term sexual encounters 
and more sexual partners, men have probably been selected for a keen ability to 
recognize cues of female sexual interest. This judgment, however, is made under 
considerable uncertainty and is prone to error. An error management perspec-
tive predicts that inaccurate judgments should be systematically biased toward 
overperception-perceiving sexual interest when there is none. It is plausible that 
an overestimation bias for men was selected because missing a sexual opportu-
nity due to underestimating sexual interest would have been more reproductively 
costly than wasted time pursuing a disinterested woman due to overestimating 
sexual interest. 
Many studies using diverse methods support the sexual overperception predic-
tion. These methods have included judging sexual interest or intent in face-to-
face interactions of opposite-sex stranger dyads (Abbey, 1982; Harnish, Abbey, & 
DeBono, 1990; Saal, Johnson, & Weber, 1989; Shea, 1993), videotaped interactions 
and/or photos (Abbey, Cozzarelli, McLaughlin, & Harnish, 1987; Abbey & Melby, 
1986; Edmondson & Conger, 1995; Saal ct al., 1989; Shotland & Craig, 1988), vi-
gnettes (Abbey & Harnish, 1995, DeSouza, Pierce, Zanelli, & Hutz, 1992; Haselton 
& Buss, 2000; Kowalski, 1993), naturalistic personal experiences (Haselton, 2003; 
Koenig, Kirkpatrick, & Ketelaar, 2007), and experiments (Maner et al., 2005). 
For example, in a typical unscripted live or videotaped lab interaction study 
(e.g., Abbey, 1982), male observers judged female participants' sexual interest to-
ward the male participant to be higher than did female observers, and higher than 
what the female participants themselves reported. This finding shows that men 
overestimate women's sexual interest relative to two potential baseline compari-
son points (judgments of other women and the reports of women themselves). In a 
representative vignette study (Haselton & Buss, 2000), male respondents inferred 
more sexual interest than did female respondents from a range of hypothetical 
behaviors enacted by a third-party woman in a fictitious dating scenario. 
These results are not simply due to men overstating the sexual interest of all 
people. There is no consistent evidence of a directional bias when men judge other 
men's sexual interest (e.g., Abbey, 1982; Haselton & Buss, 2000). The bias is also 
not shared by women, who appear to l'ithcr underperceive men's sexual interest 
(e.g., Abbey, 1982) or sho"" no clear directional bias (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000), 
depending on the study. Overall, these findings point to a consistent sex differ-
ence in judging the sexual interest of opposite-sex individuals: men overperceive 
women's (and only women's) sexual interest, but not \'ice versa. Men's mispercep-
tion bias appears to be further limited to women who are appropriate sex partners, 
so for instance, it is absent when men rate their sisters' sexual interest (Haselton 
& Buss, 2000). 
The results amassed from these interaction studies are corroborated by natural-
istic survey data. for example, Haselton (2003) asked responders to report past 
instances in whic.h their sexual intentions (or lack thereof) were misperceived 
by opposite-sex other::., and found that women, unlike men, reported episodes 
of overperccption more often than underpcrception. Another study found that in 
opposite-sex college friendship dyads, men tended to rate the sexual interest of 
close female friends more highly than those female friends rated their own in-
terest, whereas the reverse was true for women's ratings of their male friend's 
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interest (Koenig et al., 2007). The same predicted pattern of sex differences is re-
vealed in research examining perception of affect. A recent study asked men and 
women to infer emotions ("microexpressions") in photographed faces that were 
actually emotionally neutral, and found that men who were induced to be in a 
romantic mood inferred more sexual arousal in female faces relative to men in a 
neutral mood, whereas women in a romantic mood did not exhibit the same shift 
when assessing male facial expressions (Maner et al., 2005). Another recent study 
failed to find evidence of the predicted sexual overperception effect. The authors 
concluded that men may simply be generally bad at decoding sexual vs. friendly 
cues rather than biased toward false positive errors (Farris, Treat, Viken, & McFall, 
2008). However, given the abundance of the evidence showing that men's bias is 
directional (biased toward over- rather than under-perception), this result appears 
to be an anomaly. 
Percepfio11s of Men's Com111if111ent Intent: A Healthy Dose of Skepticism. Women's 
reproduction requires substantial obligatory investment in offspring during preg-
nancy and childrearing (Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006b; Trivers, 1972). These re-
quirements have likely shaped women's preferences for mates who display con-
vincing cues of long-term commitment and thus appear to be willing to provide 
resources during pregnancy and beyond (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). As with sexual in-
tent, perceptions of commitment intent are prone to error due to incomplete infor-
mation and an incentive for men to exaggerate their commitment (Haselton, Buss, 
Oubaid, & Angleitner, 2005). Error management theory predicts a directional bias 
for these errors: women should underestimate men's commitment intent rather 
than overestimate it. This is so because becoming pregnant and being deserted by 
a male partner as a result of overestimated commitment would have been more 
reproductively costly than temporarily delaying reproduction due to underesti-
mated commitment (e.g., awaiting more evidence of commitment before having 
sex). 
This prediction has not been tested as extensively as sexual overperception, but 
research has supported it. Using the same vignette scenarios as described above, 
Haselton and Buss (2000) asked participants to rate the likelihood that a variety of 
dating behaviors indicated an interest in a long-term romantic relationship. The 
results showed that female respondents inferred less long-term interest when men 
engaged in these behaviors (i.e., less commitment intent) than did male respon-
dents. No such sex differences emerged in rating women's long-term interest from 
identical behaviors (Haselton & Buss, 2000; also see Haselton et al., 2005, for a 
discussion of additional evidence). 
Perceptions of Men's Sexual Coerciveness Across the Ovulatory Cycle. An error man-
agement approach also predicts adaptive changes in the psychology of individu-
als across time based on cues indicating changes in the relative costs of false posi-
tive and false negative errors (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). One notable type of shift 
occurs in women across the ovulatory cycle: the costs of having sex with an un-
desirable partner rise as ovulation approaches and fertility increases (Gangestad 
& Thornhill, 2008; Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006a). Error management logic thus 
predicts that women will be particularly wary of sexual coercion when fertility 
is high-facilitated by erring on the side of overestimating sexual coerciveness 
in men. This is precisely what a recent study found: women in the high-fertility 
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phase of the cycle rated men appearing in videotaped interactions with women 
as more sexua lly coercive than did women in other cycle phases (Garver-Apgar, 
Gangestad, & Simpson, 2007). 
Other Mating-Rrlated Bwses. Error management theory has also been applied to 
iudgment biases in other mating-related domains, including underestimating the 
extent to which one has been forgiven by a romantic partner after a transgression 
(thus prompting a more complete mending of the relationship; Friesen, Fletcher, & 
Overall, 2005), overestimating the desirability of same-sex competitors (possibly 
to facilitate keener competition, Hill, 2007), and men overestimating the chances 
that their romantic partners have been sexually unfaithful (to protect against the 
high costs of cuckoldry; Andrews et al., 2008; also see Haselton & Nettle, 2006, for 
a' ariety of additional predictions not yet tested). In sum, across the many judg-
ments and decisions people make in the courtship context, there are many biases 
that were predicted by and are sensible in light of error management theory. 
ERROR MANAGEMENT: SUMMARY 
These examples, like those in the heuristics section, demonstrate that biases of-
ten are not flaws that reveal fundamental irrationality of the mind. Rather, error 
management biases are solutions that minimize particularly costly errors and pro-
duce a net benefit to the decision maker. In contrast to common assumptions, the 
logic of error management shows that 5uperior designs are not always those that 
maximize accu1acy but are systematically biased to commit the least costly error. 
The direction of an error management bias-whether it is optimistic as in the case 
of sexual overperception or parn11oid as in the case of disease avoidance-differs 
depending on the domain of decision, traits of the perceiver (e.g., male\ s. female), 
and contextual cues indicating shifting costs and benefib (Haselton & Nettle, 
2006). Successful hypotheses about the direction of bias often require models of 
the ancestral past and thus demonstrate the power of evolutionary thinking for 
understanding what othen'Vise might be deemed quirky features of the mind. 
ARTIFACTS 
A criticism of the classic heuristics and biases approach is that the strategies often 
used for identifying bias and e\ aluating cognitive performance might not be ap-
propriate. lf researchers place humans in unnatural settings, present problems for 
which the humnn mind is not designed, or evaluate performance in reference to 
standards other than those which would have aided our ancestors in survival and 
reproduction, it should not come as n surprise that humans appear systematically 
irrational. The third and final category in our evolutionary taxonomy of bias, artif-
acts, contains phenomena that are subject to these criticisms. We give two general 
examples within this category: (1) those resulting from the use of evolutionari ly 
invalid problem formats or problem contents and, (2) evaluation in reference to 
normative standards that are not reasonable models of the evolved mind. 
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EVOLUTIONARILY-INVALID PROBLEM FORMATS AND CONTENTS 
Frequencies Versus Probabilities. Many of the shortcomings of human reasoning 
claimed in the heuristics and biases literature concern failures in estimating event 
probabihhes or likelihoods (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983). Spurring a long 
and active debate, Gigerenzer (1997), Cosmides and Tooby (1996), and others have 
suggested that people should demonstrate proficiency at likelihood estimation 
when presented with input in the form of discrete events-11nt11ml freq11encie<>-as 
compared with numerical probabilities. Thus, investigations of likelihood estima-
tion will be compromised when researchers do not use natural frequencies. The 
argument is that frequencies of events are observable in nature, whereas prob-
abilitiec; are mathematical abstractions that lack any direct connection to sensory 
input (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1997). In addition, when computing probabilities one losec; 
information about base rates (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996), so frequencies actually 
convey superior information. 
To illustrate, consider the famous Linda problem. Respondents read a personality 
dec;cription: "l inda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored 
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimina-
tion and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations." They 
were then asked to determine which of two options was more probable: (a) Linda 
is a bank teller, or (b) Linda is a bank teller and active m the feminist movement. 
Between 80% and 90°'0 of respondents selected the second of the two-Linda is a 
bank teller and active in the feminist movement-as the more probable option, 
even though the conjunction of the two options cannot be more likely that either 
of its components. I lence, people committed the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & 
Kaheman, 1983). 
As a test of the natural frequency hypothesis, several researchers presented clas-
sic problems in frequency rather than probability format (e.g., how many out of 
200 women arc bank tellers and how many out of 200 arc bank tellers and femi-
ni<:>ts), and found that frequencies dramatically 1mpro\'cd performance (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1996; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; but see Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Gaissmaier, Straubinger, & funder, 2007; 
and Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007, for a recent round of debate surrounding these 
studies) Improving performance by providing natural frequencies as input has 
implications that go beyond our general point about e\ olutionarily valid problem 
formats. ln contrast to the ancestral world, in modern contexts such as medical 
diagnosb exa(t numerical probability judgments are often crucial, and it is impor-
tant to give decision-makers information in a form they can easily use (Hoffrage, 
Lind<>ey, I lertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Training doctors to translate diagnosis 
problems into natural frequencies has shown to be three times as effective in help-
ing them correctly reason about outcomes as compared with traditional rule-based 
training (Kurzcnhauser & Hoffrage, 2002). 
Problem Content; Cheater Detection. Often researchers compare human perfor-
mance to idealized mies of logic or mathematics. From an evolutionary perspec-
tiYe, however, the important problems of judgment arc not so abstract. They in-
volve dilemmas such as determining whether foods are safe to eat, who to choose 
as a mate, whether a patch of land will contain food resources, and who is a cheat-
er in a social exchange. People find falsification logic neither intuiti\ e nor easy 
to use, as an) one who has taught statistics knows. It does not come as a surprise 
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then, that people are not especially good at testing the abstract conditional rule, 
if p then q. In classic studies, Wason (1983) showed that people easily recognized 
that confirmatory evidence (the presence of p) is needed to test the conditional, 
but they often failed to test for falsifications (the absence of q). In the same line of 
research, howe\'er, problems involving particular contents dramatically changed 
performance on the task (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Lcgrenzi, 1972, Wason 
& Shapiro, 1971). Cosmides (1989) argued that the operation of a cheater-detection 
algorithm could explain many of these content effects. She argued that when the 
conditional rule involves social exchange (if you take the benefit, p, then you pay 
the cost, q), people look not only for confirmatory evidence (benefits taken, p) but 
also disconfirmatory e\ idence (cost not paid, not q). These contents changed per-
formance from 25~o correct (Wason, 1983) to 75% correct (Cosmides, 1989) Cos-
mides (1989) proposed that the performance differed because the content elicited 
mechanisms for cheater detection, which used falsification logic, given the nature 
of the adaptive problem to be solved (Cosmides, 1989; fiddick, Cosmides, & Too-
by, 2000; see Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, for an extensive discussion, including a 
description of the many variants of the task devised to rule out confounds and 
alternative explanations; also see Pereya, 2000, for similar content effects involving 
hazard detection). 
An important point in this work is that humans do not reason according to the 
rules of abstract logic, but instead reason according to the task demands of spe-
cific adaptive information-processing problems. This is nicely demonstrated by 
manipulations in which adaptive responses systematically violate normative rules 
(e.g., switched social contracts, Cosmides, 1989). Proper adaptive functioning of 
the mind can only be observed when people encounter content that their minds 
are designed to handle. 
QUESTIONING NORMATIVE STANDARDS 
AS GOOD MODELS OF THE EVOLVED MIND 
In order to judge behavior as rational or not, there must be a standard for compar-
ison-achieving accuracy, adherence to a logical rule, or maximizing some out-
come. We have already questioned the standard of accuracy or truth-although 
adapth e systems should achieve reasonable accuracy, trade-offs in error costs of-
ten render systems biased toward particular errors superior to those maximizing 
accuracy. The cheater-detection example demonstrates that abstract logical rules 
often do not fit with the practical problems human beings must solve. The follow-
ing are several other cases with questionable standards for comparison when the 
goal is to evaluate whether the mind is well designed. 
The Hot-Hand Fallacy. The hot-hand fallacy occurs when research participants 
expect lucky streaks in hits and misses in everything from basketball to coin tosses 
(Gilovich et al., 1985) when in fact the probabilities of events are independent. 
When Kobe Bryant hits many shots in a row, for instance, the natural expectation 
is that he's got a hot hand and will shoot another successfully. People are often 
surprised to discover that this strong intuition does not square with the reality 
that the success of the next shot is determined independently from the shot be· 
fore it. Heuristics and biases researchers attribute demonstrations of the hot-hand 
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phenomenon to humans' poor conceptions of chnnce, owing to the use of the fal-
lible representntivencss heuristic (Gilovich ct al, 1985), in which participants mis-
takenly inferred that the small, obserYed sequence is representative of the larger 
sample as a whole. 
The fornging example presented in the heuristics section hints at an alterative 
explanation for the hot hand phenomenon. Wilke and Barrett (2009) proposed that 
prior researcher.., might have started from the wrong pince by asking why people 
are bad at random events and judging evolutionarily no\'el events like coin tosses, 
gambling, and sports. Instead, one can ask about the structure of objects and events 
surrounding important adaptive problems faced by our ancestors, and what kinds 
of adaptations might have been shaped by selection. Wilke and Barrett argued thnt 
mnny of these-plants, animals, human settlements, and even weather-would 
h,1\ e been organized in an aggregated, clumpy fashion (Taylor, 1961; Taylor et al., 
1978) -not perfectly at random (independent) like events in Las Vegas. Thus, the 
default human expectation is aggregation, dumpiness, and nonindependence. 
To explore this hypothesis, Wilke and Barrett (2009) devised computer tasks in 
which pnrticipants could forage for fruits, com tosses, and several other kinds of 
resources, and presented them to American undergraduates and a South American 
indigenous population of hunter-horticulturalists (the Shuar). In each population, 
research participants exhibited the hot-hand phenomenon for all resource types, 
despite the fact that the resources were distributed randomly by the computer. 
The exception was for coin tosses for the American students only, in which the 
hot-hand expectation was reduced though not altogether eliminated. Wilke and 
Bnrrett (2009) concluded that the expectation of aggregation in space and time may 
be the psychological default that is overcome only through extensive experience 
with truly independent random phenomena like coin tosses. This conclusion is 
quite different from the original explanation offered for the phenomenon-that it 
is attributable to the fallible representativeness heuristic and thus is a shortcoming 
of the mind . 
Future Di~co1111ting. When evaluated against many standards of economic utility, 
humans have a tendency to oven alue immediate benefits relative to long-term 
gains (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). For example, a person who 
prefers a reward of $10 today over a reward of $12 tomorro\<\ is discounting the 
future. Much of the past research on the topic has investigated negative outcomes 
such as poorer academic performance and increased abuse of psychoactive sub-
stances that are experienced by high future discounters (e.g., Gottdiencr, Mu-
rawski, & Kucharski, 2008), leading researchers to label people who prefer imme-
diate rewards with terms like impulsive, short-sighted, lacking self-control, and 
ego-control failure (e.g., Ainslie, 1974; Gottdiener ct al., 2008; Green, 1982; Logue, 
1988; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Rachlin & Green, 1972). The clear mes-
sage from this literature is that preferring immediate rewards over later rewards is 
irrational a puale to be solved. 
Again, might the research question be set up backwards? Rather than simply 
noting mismatches between human preferences and monetary maximization, and 
seeking to explain the lapse in rationality, one could begin by asking how the ps1-
chology of intertemporal choice might reasonably have been shaped by evolution. 
atural selection favors discounting the future and taking immediate rewards 
\<\hen the costs of waiting outweigh the benefits of waiting. These include the real 
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possibility that an organism could die before living to the future date to reap the 
reward, thus forfeiting the chance to translate the resource into the currency of re-
production (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 2005). Female parasitic wasps, for example, shift 
their egg-laying depending on changes in barometric pressure linked with the ap-
proach of deadly thunderstorms. The wasps lay more eggs on low-quality patches 
in a chamber mimicking the conditions of an incoming thunderstorm (rapidly 
dropping barometric pressure) than on a fair summer day (steady barometric pres-
sure). Rather than delaying to search for a better option, wasps deposit their eggs 
immediately in a poor patch in order to avoid reproductive failure (Roitberg, Sir-
com, Roitberg, van Alphen, & Mangel, 1993). These results square with theorizing 
by some economists that future discounting is steep because there is uncertainty 
about the future (e.g., the individual might die before collecting the later reward), 
but these ideas have often lacked explicit considerations of the evolved mecha-
nisms giving rise to steep discount rates. 
Humans also show adaptive shifts in future discounting in response to changing 
conditions in the physical and social environment. For example, Wilson and Daly 
(2004) reasoned that cues indicating good returns on immediate efforts should 
lead to discounting the future more steeply. They predicted that exposure to at-
tractive women would inspire men to become more present-oriented, possibly 
as a motivation to pursue immediate mating opportunities. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, men displayed greater financial future discounting after exposure to 
attractive women compared to when they were exposed to average women. This 
shift might be part of a broader system that reorients individuals to become more 
present-oriented when faced with opportunities that require immediate action. 
The above logic indicates that discounting the future can be adaptive. One form 
of discounting that has resisted explanation, however, is the preference reversal 
under conditions of \'ariable delays. An example is when a person accepts $10 im-
mediately rather than $11 tomorrow, but prefers to accept $11 in 366 days rather 
than $10 in 365 days. In the first case, the person is impulsive; in the second case, 
he or she is patient. Putting aside the issue of transaction costs-it requires more 
effort to come back at a future date than to receive money immediately-why 
might these preference reversals occur? 
One possibility is that different evolved systems are recruited when making 
these decisions. The first system manages choices between an immediate and a 
delayed reward (e.g., $10 now or $11 tomorrow), whereas the second system man-
ages choices between a delayed and further delayed reward (e.g., $10 in 365 days 
or $11 in 366 days; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; Mc-
Clure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Using fMRI methods, McClure and 
colleagues found support for the idea that the prospect of an immediate reward 
activates limbic system reward-related areas that are rich in dopaminergic inner-
vation and are linked to impulsive behavior. The activation of the limbic system 
may prompt organisms to act immediately to secure the available rewards. In 
contrast, being presented with the choice of two delayed rewards activates pre-
frontal and parietal areas of the brain associated with deliberative processes and 
numerical computation. Although the precise adaptive functions of these brain 
areas remain to be specified, research along these lines demonstrates how thinking 
about whether systems with different functions are recruited to solve superficially 
similar problems can provide insights into why there are these apparent lapses in 
rationality. 
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ARTlfACTS: SUMMARY 
We have presented just a few examples to illustrate how a reconsideration of the 
standards used to judge performance can radically change conclusions about hu-
man rationality. Bv asking what information would have been available over hu-
man e\olutionary history as inputs for problem solving, what counts as a good 
solution within content domains crucial for survival and reproduction, and what 
ends humans should have evolved to maximize, we flip many of the conclusions 
drawn by heuristics and biases researchers on their heads. Instead of noting the 
mismatches between human performance and modern, idealized standards-and 
concluding that the mind is compromised in some way-evolutionary minded 
researchers reveal good solutions with a tight fit to enduring natural problems that 
may sometimes perform at their worst in the peculiar modem world. 
DISCUSSION 
ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY A D SPECIALIZED, EVOLVED DESIGN 
A major theme emerging from our evolutionary analysis is the importance of spe-
cialized, e\'Ol\'ed design: humans are adaptively rational to the extent that their 
minds are well designed for recurrent problems affoctmg surviva l and reproduc-
tion. We argue that the pendulum should continue to swing away from a focus on 
bias and error and toward developing models of the crucial adaptive problems 
our ancestors needed to solve, including realistic assessments of what information 
humans had available to them. In short, researchers benefit from developing mod-
els of design solutions to problems of judgment and decision making faced over 
millennia, and conducting research to test them. As demonstrated by the many 
examples presented in this article, once these models are developed and tested, 
the mind shows a remarkably tight fit to naturalistic human challenges. From this 
perspective, the mind appears reasonable, even rational. The emerging picture 
produced by these newer breeds of explanation is quite different from the heavy 
emphasis on irrationality in earlier treatments of heuristics and biases (see Lopes, 
1991; Krueger & Funder, 2004). 
The strategy of focusing on and elucidating good design is not an apologia in-
tended to place the rational mind on a pedestal just for admiration: it is practical. 
Doing so should achieve at least four desirable outcomes. First, we take the suc-
cess of key examples in this paper-ecologically rational simple heuristics, au-
ditory looming and other error management phenomena, improving probability 
judgment with frequency formats, and so on-as an indication that researchers 
can achieve a clearer view of the architecture of the mind by using an evolutionary 
theoretical approach. Scientific progress will not grind to a halt without the ap-
proach, but surely researchers benefit from considering whether their theoretical 
assumptions and psychological models are evolutionarily sensible. Second, if we 
are correct that many bias and error phenomena are artifacts of unnatural research 
settings or questionable normative standards, the approach could help research-
ers "clean house" and focus instead on the phenomena likely to have more impact 
on humans' daily thoughts and beha\ iors (Haselton & Funder, 2006). Third, this 
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strategy helps expose cases in which the evolved design of the mind is at odds 
with the demands of the modern environment, a point we elaborate below. And, 
fourth, it helps researchers sort through bias and error phenomena to determine 
which are actually reasonable feature!-> of the mind, and which are true oddities. 
Where there arc these real mysteries, there are exciting discoveries to be made. 
TAXONOMY OF BIASES 
Our threefold taxonomy of biases and heuristics, error management effects and 
design artifacts does not perfectly organize biases into mutually exclusive catego-
ries. Rather, we offer this taxonomy as a tool for e\.aluating the causes of apparent 
lapses in rationality. For instance, our discussion on the hot-hand phenomenon 
and our suggestion that it serves as an adaptation to detect aggregation in the 
world (rather than being a fallacious perception about random sequences), can 
also be tackled from an error management perspective. If missing a resource pat-
tern would have been so costly in past environments, then we might expect our 
perceptual system to more often falsely perceive the presence than the absence of 
a pattern than fail to do so (c.f. Nesse, 2001). Similarly, some biases of the social 
psychology literature can be considered as heuristics that contain elements of error 
management. For example, self-enhancement may result from an error as} mmctry 
in which false modesty is more costly than mistaken pride (Krueger & Mueller, 
2002). 
OPEN VERSUS CLOSED DEVCLOPMENTAL SYSTEMS 
Many readers arc surely wondering where cxperience--lcaming-is in our analy-
sis. An important question for all rescarLh on psychological adaptations is to what 
extent any adaptation is de\. elopmentally closed, such that in nearly all typical de-
velopmental environments the same general design will emerge, or developmen-
tally open to influence by environmental contingencies (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; 
Mayr, 1974). Whether systems for making judgments and decisions are open or 
closed should depend on the demands of the adaptive problem, and thus the na-
ture and extent of environmental influence should be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. Taking error management biases, for instance, Haselton and Nettle (2006) 
reasoned that systems of food a\. ersion and snake fear are relatively developmen-
tally closed since they appear only to require triggering by the environment and 
other, more deadly modem hazards do not show the same conservative patterning 
(e.g., fast-moving automobiles and obesity, which are much more likely to kill us). 
On the other hand, error management biases relating to optimism about achieving 
future benefits (positi\'e illusions) appear much more open to environmental influ-
ence and they show greater variation in their manifestations across societies (sec 
Haselton & Nettle, 2006, for a re\ icw). 
Clearly, there are some learning systems that are sufficiently wide open that they 
can produce completely novel reasoning skills, such as how to do calculus or that 
coin flips in a series are truly independent. These skills arc subjectively difficult. 
The fact that they require much practice and effort serves as a reminder that not 
all reasoning skills are equally leamablc. The key point for this discussion i!; that 
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some e\ oln?d systems of judgment, reasoning, and decision-making are deeply 
entrenched and less responsive to alteration to any differing demands presented 
by the modern world, whereas others adapt more smoothly. 
rROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT 
In closing, we wish to note that the approach ""e advocate does not necessarily 
diminish the lessons learned in earlier research. The modern world is governed by 
novel economic rules and new social challenges. Knowledge of how our evolved 
psychology leads us to behave in ways that contrast"" ith our self-interest in light 
of these rules should prove important to human happiness: what benefited our an-
cestors' reproductive success is often at odds with our own wishes for how to live. 
Where there are these clash points, only by understanding each of the two pieces-
thc psychological adaptations in question and the modern context in which they 
operate- -can we have the knowledge required to choose the best course of ac-
tion. 
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